Stop listening to David Petraeus

Let’s be frank. David Petraeus never misses an opportunity to present himself as a modern-day MacArthur, a genius in the art of war whose 2007 military campaign in Iraq is the benchmark for aspiring strategists seeking to profit from parodies of armed conflict .

It’s no surprise, then, that the former general and CIA director weighed in recently with a didactic introduction aimed at Israeli civilian and military leaders overseeing one of the worst war-related calamities of the 21st century. Follow my advice, Petraeus submits, and you too will succeed, like me, in overturning a failing war.

Last week, Petraeus co-authored an opinion piece in Foreign Affairs with Meghan L. O’Sullivan, professor at Harvard Kennedy School, and Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security. But make no mistake, this was not a serious analysis of the ongoing Israeli conflict, but rather an opportunity for the general himself to highlight his personal “successes” in Iraq and demonstrate their lessons universal to any conflict in the Middle East.

In fact, what Petraeus and his co-authors wrote is an example of why a lesson-based approach the story is flawed at best and dangerous at worst. It also shows how, nearly 15 years after US troops left Iraq, the retired general still yearns to control and revise the narrative of America’s disastrous intervention in Middle East affairs.

The authors begin by falsely comparing current Israeli military strategy against the Palestinians to that of Iraq.change of diet» under the administration of George W. Bush. It seems clear, however, through its actions, that the Netanyahu government aims much higher rather than replacing Hamas with another entity capable of representing Palestinian political aspirations. Given the operations carried out by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent months, we might wonder whether Netanyahu is seeking “regime change” or gaining total physical, political, and economic control over Palestinian lives. eradication?

Petraeus et al. describing Israeli actions as an “understandable response” to the appalling and indefensible terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023. Yet while such a response is so immensely disproportionate, when the disparities between victims are so incredibly infuriating, how can this be understandable? Senior civilian and military leaders are supposed to manage violence on behalf of their state, not be the main proponents of its unfettered use. Yet Netanyahu denounces any limitation to this violence and has spared no effort to defend what can only be described as war atrocities.

So how can Netanyahu learn from America’s “successes” in Iraq? Of course, looking at the 2007 surge under Petraeus. What follows in the Foreign Affairs article are three broad “lessons” which, unsurprisingly, constitute the central pillars of the surge myth that the general and his acolytes have made progress for more than a decade now.

First, Israelis should “clear and hold” territory to eliminate Hamas terrorists, just as U.S. forces did with insurgents operating in Iraq. Although Petraeus, O’Sullivan, and Fontaine acknowledge that civilian casualties “inevitably result”—thus conveniently avoiding responsibility for those casualties—they provide no evidence that the IDF intends to protect Palestinian civilians once the territory busy. In fact, the opposite appears to be true since IDF soldiers are regularly captured on film mocking the civilians displaced by the fighting raging around them.

In truth, the authors rarely, if ever, mention innocent Palestinians. Instead, they focus their arguments on these “criminals, insurgents, and reconstituted Hamas battalions,” meekly suggesting that Israelis should commit to “making life better and safer for civilians.” One wonders how this could happen when they simultaneously recommend that the IDF build gated communities, checkpoints, biometric controls, and engage in “constant patrols.” Wouldn’t ordinary Palestinian civilians view this as nothing more than a military occupation? Iraqis Who watched American troops march through their cities, fearing what followed the occupying forces?

Next, Petraeus and his team offer the lesson of “build and revitalize,” the next pillar of Surge Story and, more broadly, the theory of counterinsurgency. The lessons here are as simple as they are direct. By clearing and holding key Iraqi cities, they argue, U.S. forces provided the security necessary for political and economic initiatives to develop. Benevolent U.S. troops offered an alternative to the violence of the insurgency, while giving the Baghdad government room to rebuild a war-torn nation. All was well until irresponsible civilians in Washington pulled the plug and called the troops home.

Although the authors rightly acknowledge some major American missteps in Iraq, such as the de-Baathification program and the dismantling of the Iraqi army – decisions wisely made before Petraeus’ arrival – the parallels with the conflict current Israeli-Palestinian are suspicious to say the least. The authors do not note any of the Palestinian political objectives or how they conflict with long-standing Israeli goals, by simply declaring that the Palestinian Authority has “obvious flaws” and is “in need of reform.”

Given the brutality of the IDF’s operations in recent months, are we to believe that the Israeli military wishes to provide a fair “security umbrella” under which the Palestinian Authority could administer governance and basic services? And, as in Iraq, a key question remains unanswered: who defines “?”secure“in such a hostile environment? Given the IDF’s disproportionate response to the Hamas terrorist attack, it seems doubtful that the two sides can agree on an impartial definition of security.

Furthermore, Petraeus sanitizes the story here. It omits the limits of America counter-insurgency theory, the total destruction of Iraqi cities like Mosul when the United States had to return to fight against ISIS, or against failure push into Afghanistan which he himself promoted. Where was the political-economic development following American interventions? The general never says it.

Finally, Petraeus offers his most self-serving recommendation, advising the Israelis to “tell them how this will end.” The title of a Biography Broadly speaking, the term is shorthand for defining a “clearly desired end state” in hopes of gaining and then maintaining political support for fighting generational wars. For the general, this is the main failure of the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Policymakers have failed to convince the nation of the need for long-term occupation of foreign lands to ensure security both domestically and abroad. They made the mistake of garnering lasting support for the “resource-intensive strategy that was successful during the U.S. advance in Iraq.”

At best, it’s a narcissistic portrait of a retired general seeking relevance by pontificating on all things military. At worst, it is a flawed story that advocates more bloodshed, confusing America’s disastrous wars in Iraq with a slaughterhouse in Gaza. Either way, it’s time to stop trying to learn from David Petraeus and look for the one thing missing from the general’s essay on Foreign Affairs: a diplomatic end to the carnage of yet another war more unfair.