Modi and Putin should think about another plan: balancing China

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will soon visit Russia, where he will hold talks with President Vladimir Putin. This will be Modi’s first foreign visit for a bilateral meeting in his third term. While the announcement has already sparked reactions across the world, it is emblematic of India continuing to play a balancing act under Modi 3.0 and reassure Russia of its goodwill and partnership. Meanwhile, Modi will not attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit that begins today in Astana, Kazakhstan, and will be represented by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar.

Modi’s last visit to Russia was in 2019, when he attended the Eastern Economic Forum and the annual bilateral summit, a process instituted in 2000. The last talks between the two leaders took place in December 2021, during Putin’s visit to India.

Given that this will be the first bilateral summit between India and Russia since the latter began its “special military operations” in Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian conflict and trade – which have reached unprecedented levels largely due to the reduced price of Russian oil – will obviously be high on the agenda. The two countries are also set to upgrade their defence ties with a new deal that will involve the joint deployment of troops, warships and fighter jets – something India has never done with any other country. An agreement on logistical support is also on the agenda.

Russia-China friendship deepens, but…

It is widely believed that Modi will not attend the SCO summit to avoid a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, given the strained relations between the two neighbours since the Galwan clashes in the summer of 2020. At the same time, India has been concerned about the strengthening ties between Russia and China in recent times. There is no doubt that the discussions will also focus on this aspect.

The partnership between Russia and China has evolved since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. China was the first country chosen by Putin for an official visit after his re-election in March this year. As a larger neighbor with far greater financial resources than India, this is natural. Bilateral trade between the two countries amounts to more than $240 billion. China is Russia’s largest importer of crude oil, while Chinese products, from automobiles to clothing, are filling the void left by the flight of Western companies from Russia. The Chinese yuan accounted for 34.5 percent of Russia’s total export payments in the past two years. China has provided Russia with dual technology, and the two countries have also conducted joint military exercises. In fact, Beijing has been accused by the West of both encouraging and profiting from the Ukraine conflict.

The Sino-Russian partnership is not infallible, however. New Delhi and Moscow can explore certain avenues to counterbalance China’s influence in the Eurasian region.

There are gaps to be filled

The lack of progress on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which Russia is keen to see built to bolster its economy, is perhaps an important indicator of the shortcomings in Sino-Russian relations. According to Russian analysts, this is the main reason for Putin’s visit to Beijing. However, nothing has been done. Industry experts in China have instead pointed to the pipeline’s infeasibility.

After his visit to China, Putin also made trips to Uzbekistan, North Korea and Vietnam. All three destinations are symbols of major geopolitical changes.

Uzbekistan, which is part of the post-Soviet space of Central Asia, is in Russia’s strategic backyard. China’s advances in the region have been limited to the economic sphere, with Russia retaining its military and strategic influence. This was one of the main reasons for the creation of the SCO. But Russia’s interest in Ukraine has upset this arrangement.

For example, a railway line that was mooted nearly two decades ago but has been shelved due to Moscow’s reservations has recently received the green light from China, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan – another close Russian ally in post-Soviet Central Asia. The line will run from Kashgar in China through Kyrgyzstan to the Uzbek province of Andijan, bypassing Russian territory. Moreover, the Kyrgyz portion of the line will be financed with Chinese loans, further plunging it into Chinese debt.

For comparison, a similar Chinese debt owed to Tajikistan, which hosts Russia’s largest overseas military base, led Tajikistan to cede territory to the Chinese for their own base.

Perhaps it was to regain this space that Tashkent became Putin’s second destination after his return to power. Particularly striking were the nuclear cooperation agreements signed: Russia would build a small nuclear power plant – the first in Central Asia – and increase Russian gas supplies to Uzbekistan. The modernization of the gas transportation system is also part of the agreements, which means long-term projects.

Russia in China’s Backyard

Putin’s other two visits were to North Korea and Vietnam, in East and Southeast Asia, which China considers its strategic backyard.

In North Korea, the two sides signed a defense treaty, diversifying their security partnerships. Until now, China was the only country with which North Korea had a defense alliance. China’s response to the deal has been muted, but analysts say it is actually a headache for Beijing, which fears the pact will draw unnecessary American attention to the region. The deal could also cause an imbalance of power in Northeast Asia.

China and Vietnam had strained relations until recently. However, while relations have improved at the party level and in the economic sphere, the Vietnamese military remains wary of Beijing and its expansionist policies in the South China Sea, where the Vietnam Special Economic Zone is located. A series of agreements were signed between Russia and Vietnam during Vladimir Putin’s visit, including in the energy sector. The Russian president also expressed his willingness to increase cooperation with ASEAN.

More recently, last week, Russia finalized an agreement with another Chinese ally, Cambodia, for cooperation between their ground forces. This is a first in bilateral relations between the two countries.

Putin’s Asian Pivot

Overall, Russia has been looking to Asia since at least 2014, when the first sanctions were imposed on it by the West. With his visits to North Korea and Vietnam, Putin has demonstrated that he has options in the region. And that is something that does not please China. Beijing sees itself as the natural leader of the Global South and is the main power in ASEAN. Russia, on the other hand, is just a newcomer.

According to Professor Baladas Ghoshal, former professor and chair of Southeast Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Southeast Asian countries are more development and economic oriented, for which they depend on China. However, they are not very comfortable with too much proximity to China.” The recent desire of a number of ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, to join BRICS stems from this desire to hedge against China and seek balance with other powers, such as Russia.

The example of Sri Lanka

This opens a window of opportunity for India-Russia cooperation in third countries to counterbalance China’s growing footprint. South Asia, India’s sphere of influence into which China has made deep inroads, already offers one such example. In April, the Sri Lankan government announced that it was handing over management of the Chinese-built Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport to India’s Shaurya Aeronautics (Pvt) Ltd. and Russia’s Airports of Regions Management Company. The $209 million airport had been loss-making since 2013. Strategically located near the Chinese-run Hambantota port, the joint Indo-Russian presence will help counter Chinese influence close to India’s borders.

The two countries are also cooperating in the construction of the Roopur nuclear power plant in Bangladesh, for which Russia is the builder and India is the logistics partner. Another example is the sale of the Brahmos cruise missile system to the Philippines, which is currently in conflict with China in the South China Sea. The missile was jointly developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s NPOM, and its export required Russia’s approval.

This Indo-Russian cooperation can also extend to ASEAN and Central Asian countries. For example, India, Vietnam and Russia can work together in the hydrocarbon sector, with ONGC Videsh having a presence in Vietnam. Defence is another area where the two countries can cooperate. This makes sense because not only are Central Asian countries tied to Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, but ASEAN members like Vietnam and Indonesia also have close defence cooperation with Moscow.

It is true that India and Russia do not have the financial means that China has. But if China’s calling card is its massive investments and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia and India can leverage their position by making joint efforts to boost trade and investment in Central Asia, the ASEAN region and even South Asia. This would be a victory not only for the countries in these three regions, but also for Russia and India, which would thus oppose China’s expansionist policies.

(Aditi Bhaduri is a journalist and political analyst)

Disclaimer: These are the author’s personal opinions.