How will Trump approach a second term, Israel and wars in the Middle East?

On By Pranco

The past is an imperfect predictor of the future, or – in simpler terms – what was is not necessarily what will be. That could be the case, but that doesn’t necessarily have to be the case.

This statement is worth keeping in mind when gauging the impact of Tuesday’s stunning win over Once and future president Donald Trump. There was clearly relief and satisfaction in Jerusalem over the outcome of the election results, as the assumption is that Jerusalem will have an easier time with a Trump presidency than with a Kamala Harris presidency.

This assumption is not based on thin air, but rather on recent history: Jerusalem had a much easier time with Washington during Trump’s first term than during US President Joe Biden’s term. The expectation was that a Harris presidency would have continued the tone and approach of Biden’s policies toward Israel, albeit perhaps without the same warmth toward the Jewish state that the outgoing president felt and showed.

During his first term, Trump took numerous steps – from moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, to recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, to mediating the Abraham chords – which showed unprecedented alignment with Israel’s priorities.

Could these pro-Israel policies continue? That certainly could be the case, but Trump 2.0 will not necessarily be a continuation of Trump 1.0. As reassuring as Trump’s previous gestures have been, his second term – and his relationship with Israel – will be shaped by new circumstances, new priorities and new personalities around him.

Republican presidential candidate and former US President Donald Trump appears at a congratulatory sign for the 2024 US presidential election in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 6, 2024. (credit: THOMAS PETER/REUTERS)

For example, he is constitutionally prohibited from running for president again, but Trump will reenter the White House on January 20, beholden to no one. While he obviously wants to ensure that his party wins the by-elections, his policies will not be as influenced by classical political considerations – what any of his key constituencies will say or think – as they were during his first term.

It’s not like he’s ever really had to factor the Jewish vote into his calculations — he’s never had the Jewish vote, though his share of the Jewish vote on Tuesday, at least according to Fox News’ exit poll, rose from 24% in 2016 , up to 30% in 2020, up to 32% in the most recent elections – an increase of 8% in eight years, not insignificant in tight elections in battleground states.

But the target audience for some of his policies toward Israel was not Jews but evangelical Christian voters, a core group of his base. As he said on the campaign trail in 2020 when speaking about his decision to move the embassy to Jerusalem: “That’s for the evangelicals. You know, that’s amazing – the Evangelicals are more excited about that than Jewish people. That’s right, it’s incredible.”

Not only does the fact that he is no longer running for office mean that he does not have to do anything for a particular constituency – and incidentally, Tuesday’s elections showed that his base is also becoming broader and more diverse – but he will not do that either . as concerned about potential donors. One of his largest donors in the current campaign (worth about $100 million) was Miriam Adelson, the widow of Sheldon Adelson, who heavily supported him in his previous attempts to become president.

Will Trump’s priorities shift?

Without the need to secure votes or campaign dollars, Trump’s priorities may shift, creating room for a different dynamic.

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Another key factor shaping his policies will be his inner circle. In his previous term, staunchly pro-Israel adviser and son-in-law Jared Kushner played a crucial role on many issues, including the Middle East. It is not clear what role he, or his wife Ivanka, will play this time.

Another key pro-Israel figure in the inner circle last time, who will not be there this time, was Vice President Mike Pence, replaced by JD Vance, an isolationist who, however, makes exceptions in his overall isolationist worldview for Israel – although he recently said the US should not be dragged into a war with Iran.

One name mentioned as having increasing influence is the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, the Christian Lebanese businessman Massad Boulos. He was in charge of Trump’s outreach to Arab Americans, which apparently had some success. (Interestingly, most Arab Americans are not Muslim, and most Muslim Americans are not Arabs.)

In the final days of the election, Trump wrote a letter to Lebanese Americans promising to “end the suffering and destruction in Lebanon” and adding that “your friends and family in Lebanon deserve to live in peace, prosperity and harmony with their neighbors to live. ”

For key national security positions – Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor – the names of several staunch pro-Israel figures have been named, including former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Senators Marco Rubio and Tom Cotton , and Richard Grenell. a former U.S. Ambassador to Germany who also served as Acting Director of National Intelligence. It is also unclear what role former US ambassador to Israel David Friedman will play in the new administration, and whether he will be allowed to return to his post in Jerusalem.

Only when Trump makes these choices in the coming weeks will the contours of his policy towards Israel and the Middle East become clearer.

Regardless of who Trump chooses for these key posts, one man in Jerusalem whose influence is sure to increase is Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer. Dermer served as Israel’s ambassador to Washington from 2013 to 2021 and developed close ties with the Trump administration, the kind of ties that new Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar will take years to develop. As such, Israel’s policy toward the new government will be determined even more than usual by those outside the Foreign Ministry: by Netanyahu himself and by Dermer.

The American political landscape plays a role

IN ADDITION to the key figures on both the American and Israeli sides who will shape the relationship, the broader American political landscape will also play an important role.

Amid all the noise about Trump’s retaking of the White House, what has received less attention — at least in Israel — is that Republicans have also taken control of the Senate and appear to be on their way to regaining control of the House. To retain representatives, and that conservatives have a majority on the Supreme Court.

That means Trump has a full house in Washington. Although the Republican Party today is strongly pro-Israel — and polls show its base supporting Israel far more than Democrats — a united Republican White House and Congress could force Netanyahu to reassess tactics.

Why? Because in this constellation it will be very difficult for Netanyahu to ignore the president’s wishes and try to circumvent what the president wants by appealing to allies in Congress. Netanyahu and Dermer are adept at achieving these kinds of goals, the best example being securing an invitation from the Republican leadership of Congress in 2015 for Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress on Iran, against the wishes from President Barack Obama.

But if the president and the leadership of the Senate and House of Representatives are all from the same party, it will be more difficult for Israel to ignore the president’s demands and try to get members of the House or Senate to undermine the president’s plans or wishes. With a Republican House and a Republican Senate, he will not be able to get them to fight the president. What this will do is limit Israel’s maneuverability and ability to say ‘no’ to Trump and there will be times when the two countries’ interests are not aligned and Netanyahu will want to take action that the president opposes, or will oppose any steps taken or proposed by the White House. House.

This is something that will impact Israel’s domestic politics, because saying “no” to the president – ​​or being willing to say “no” to the US president – ​​is actually something that has helped Netanyahu politically and not hindered.

During the Obama administration, the president — after bad advice from aides such as Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel — chose to engage in public confrontations with Netanyahu, believing this would cost Netanyahu support among an Israeli public that did not want to see their prime minister . in an argument with the American president. But the opposite happened: in confrontations between the two leaders – as happened on a number of occasions regarding settlements, the diplomatic process with the Palestinians and Iran – the Israeli public, or at least the Likud base, rallied around the prime minister .

Ironically, Netanyahu was at his strongest politically from 2009 to 2016, when Obama served as his foil in the White House. The endless cycle of five inconclusive Israeli elections in less than four years began in April 2019, with three of these elections held while Trump was president and fully backed Netanyahu. Even with that strong support, Netanyahu has not definitively won any of these elections.

It will now become increasingly difficult for Netanyahu to shore up his credentials with his base as someone who stands alone against the entire world, when Trump sits as president, flanked by a Republican House and Congress, and it will be impossible for Netanyahu to say : “no” to him.

This new environment doesn’t just affect Netanyahu’s influence; it also reshapes the opposition’s arguments. Take Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, for example. One of Lapid’s main talking points for years has been that the relationship between Israel and the US is broken, that Netanyahu broke it off because he can’t work with the Democrats, and that he could.

Now that Trump is assured of four more years, and Republicans are well entrenched in all the different branches of government, that particular argument – ​​whether the election here is held early or as mandated in October 2026 – will be much less compelling.