Israel's limited missile strike on Iran could be the start of a broader attack

AFTER DECADES of shadow war between the Jewish State and the Islamic Republic, Israel carried out its first officially recognized attack on Iran in the early hours of October 26. Dozens of fighter jets flying at least 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) from their bases in Israel launched missiles against air defense facilities and missile factories in three Iranian provinces, including on the outskirts of the capital Tehran.

It is a measure of the sky-high tensions in the Middle East that Israel’s chosen targets, which were purely military, were seen as among the more limited options. Since Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles against Israel on October 1, officials close to Binyamin Netanyahu had defended the Israeli prime minister’s view that a “historic opportunity” had arisen to deliver a strategic blow to Iran.

Instead, Israel has mainly hit Iranian S-300 air defense radars and Russian-made missile launchers, avoiding nuclear sites. Nor have the Israelis destroyed vital economic targets such as oil export terminals. This suggests that, for once, Israel is taking pressure from its American ally into account. It could also indicate that Israel is preparing the ground for another, much more devastating attack.

The key to understanding Israel’s decision is the American political calendar. With the US presidential elections just ten days away, Israel had the choice of retaliating against military targets, with America’s tacit blessing, or ignoring President Joe Biden’s explicit warnings not to use nuclear weapons on the eve of the elections. or attack energy-related facilities. The latter would have jeopardized future cooperation with a Democratic government if Kamala Harris were to win on November 5. In the event of a victory for Donald Trump, who has already expressed support for an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program, there is always a chance for future attacks.

How effective were the Israeli attacks? So far there is too little evidence to be sure. Israeli officers claim that they have destroyed most of Iran’s advanced air defense capabilities and that as a result their air force can operate freely in Iranian airspace. If true, it means that a future Israeli attack could be much more extensive.

According to Israeli security sources, most of the targets this time were hit by air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM), fired from aircraft far beyond the range of Iranian defenses. Israel’s stockpile of ALBMs is limited and a more intensive airstrike campaign against Iran would require a large number of fighter jets using shorter-range munitions. If Israel’s claims about this attack are true, this is now possible. It will take many months for Iran to rebuild its air defenses, especially when its Russian suppliers need their own batteries for their war with Ukraine.

Iran still has large numbers of missiles and drones and could launch a third attack on Israel. But such a move is unlikely to be rushed. Not only would this risk provoking a much more damaging Israeli counterattack, but Iran’s leaders are also keeping a close eye on the US elections. The biggest concern for Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the stability of his regime. Either course of action – attacking Israel again or holding the fire – carries risks. For the first time since the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the residents of Tehran have seen their city under military attack. Not responding would be seen as a sign of weakness.

But retaliation can have devastating consequences. Israel may have taken out one of Iran’s most important defenses in this attack: the S-300 batteries. It has already significantly reduced the protection Iran provides to Hezbollah, Lebanon’s Shiite militia, as a threat to Israel. Most Iranian precision-guided missiles have been destroyed in recent Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon.

For now, Iran is trying to downplay the Israeli attack; the semi-official Tasnim news agency labeled Israel’s claims as “complete lies” and said only “limited damage” had been caused. Tehran will almost certainly bide its time before deciding whether and how to respond.

There are also domestic implications for Netanyahu. After raising expectations, his political rivals are already blaming him for missing an opportunity. Before the strike, Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister and would-be right-wing challenger, urged the government to “destroy Iran’s nuclear program.” Yair Lapid, the centrist leader of the opposition, said that “the decision not to attack strategic and economic targets was mistaken.”

This time, Netanyahu has chosen to exercise strategic patience, at least for now. But if he is willing to pay a political price for taking a more moderate course of action against Iran, it almost certainly means that if Israel is waging war on the other fronts – Gaza and Lebanon – he will be less receptive to pressure for a ceasefire -fire. Add to that pressure from his far-right allies, who have the power to overthrow his government at the next session of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, which begins on October 27, and any halt to Israel’s other wars seems less likely.

The nature of this attack on Iran seems to show that when America wants to apply serious pressure, it can still determine Israeli policy. Israel has repeatedly escalated fighting in Gaza and Lebanon this year, despite the Biden administration’s urgings. This time it acted in full coordination, thus far avoiding an action that could have caused both a regional conflagration and a global rise in energy prices. However, there is a risk that this attack was just a prelude to an even more serious attack.

From The Economist, published under license. Original content can be found at www.economist.com