Early recovery and rehabilitation in regime-controlled areas of Syria: an assessment

The following is a brief summary, providing key analytical findings and policy conclusions from a recently released Middle East Institute report on post-war reconstruction in Syria.

Read the full report here.

Since the United Nations announced the creation of a Early Recovery Trust Fund for Syria in March 2024, early recovery has become a controversial issue among donors, policymakers and international organizations. At the heart of this debate are the definition of ‘early recovery’, the mechanism for allocating funds and the implications for Syria’s political transition. To assure It has emerged among civil society actors that early recovery could be a way for the Syrian regime to circumvent the reconstruction restrictions imposed on Damascus by the international community in an attempt to curb the regime’s political behavior change your own country. However, with normalization Efforts have accelerated in recent years, especially from the Gulf states and some of them European countriesFears have increased that an early recovery could further undermine the political viability of the reconstruction map as a means to achieve a meaningful political transition in Syria.

In light and against the backdrop of this political debate, MEI’s latest study, “Inside Damascus’s Reconstruction Lab: Navigating the Framework of Return and Recovery,” co-authored by Munqeth Othman Agha and Muhannad al-Rish, examines the regime’s ability to conduct controlled areas to effectively participate in early recovery and rehabilitation. It examines the political, legal and economic frameworks used by the Syrian regime to manage the dynamics of return and recovery activities, with the aim of drawing conclusions about the regime’s broader vision for national reconstruction. Damascus was chosen as the primary case study because of the extent of the destruction and the variety of reconstruction projects undertaken there in recent years.

In the wake of the regime’s consolidation of control over Damascus in 2018, it never applied any comprehensive framework for the return and rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas. Instead, official decisions have been made locally by various government agencies and security organizations. This decentralized approach has left returnees vulnerable to extortion by local security personnel, criminal gangs and contractors. The evidence collected in this study shows that regime policies deliberately restrict return and rehabilitation in areas designated for pre-conflict urban development plans, rather concentrating resources on “economically profitable” sectors and locations. The regime appears to view current return and rehabilitation efforts as temporary measures until sufficient financial and political capital is amassed to continue pre-conflict urban development projects, demolishing affected areas and replacing them with high-quality residential and commercial developments .

Conflict-affected neighborhoods remain underutilized, not only due to financial and security constraints, but also as a deliberate strategy to discourage returns, reducing resistance to future redevelopment plans and minimizing compensation for displaced property owners. In the meantime, returnees bear the financial burden of clearing debris, repairing property and restoring basic services.

The majority of current returnees come from regime-controlled areas, where obtaining security permits is relatively more feasible. However, the return of refugees from abroad or internally displaced persons from opposition-held areas remains very limited and risky. Economic pressure, such as the desire not to have to pay rent on temporary locations, largely determines the internal return. But even for these returnees, the challenges are significant: insecurity, looting, lack of basic services, financial pressure and limited access to legal support remain endemic. These difficulties have caused some returnees to leave their homes again.

Given the regime’s reconstruction blueprint, a large-scale, regime-led reconstruction effort could do more harm than good. A more effective strategy could involve facilitating the return of displaced persons from other low-risk regime-controlled areas. This approach could include small grants and micro-grants for returning displaced people, to help them rehabilitate their homes and revive local businesses. To make this strategy viable, it is essential that financial, political and legal instruments are deployed. This should include supporting civil society and grassroots initiatives, along with providing legal advice to returnees. Donors must link political pressure and operational conditions to early recovery projects in regime-controlled areas. These conditions should guarantee the issuance of return and rehabilitation permits and increase security in the return areas.

As the economy deteriorates, pro-regime actors now compete for financial resources, turning local recovery and reconstruction into a race to seize land and assets from displaced communities. For policymakers, donors, and implementing actors, understanding these dynamics within the regime’s network, including government agencies, security forces, militia leaders, and businessmen, is critical. These actors often have conflicting interests and visions on recovery after a conflict. Positive change can happen when legal and political pressure is applied, especially with the support of local residents. Strengthening residents’ organizational capacity, providing them with the necessary tools, and mobilizing local elites willing to contribute to early recovery efforts are crucial steps forward.

Munqeth Othman Agha is a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute, a researcher at the Syrian Memory Institute of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, and co-founder of the Syria Urban Research Project.

Muhannad al-Rish is a researcher and analyst specializing in security and humanitarian response in Syria, with a particular focus on the southern regions of Damascus, Daraa and Suweida.

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