US-Africa relations under Joe Biden: a mismatch between talk and action

In his first year in office, US President Joe Biden pledged to restore US-Africa relations based on a doctrine of equal partnership.

He sent his Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, to Kenya, Ivory Coast and Nigeria. The visit was used to outline the government’s policy outlook on Africa. It laid the foundation for the official US-Africa policy commitment that Blinken launched in South Africa the following year.

Since then, there have been high-level agreements between the US and African countries to deepen ties. These included visits from top members of the administration: Vice President Kamala Harris, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. First lady Jill Biden also came.

Biden hosted a well-attended US-Africa leadership summit in Washington DC in December 2022. Kenyan President William Ruto made a state visit to the White House in May.

Yet our view, based on years of studying and writing about U.S.-Africa relations, is that the Biden administration has failed to deliver on its promise to restore U.S.-Africa relations based on an equal partnership. The country has failed to recognize Africa’s growing influence in international affairs.

We argue that there is a disconnect between the rhetoric and practice of an equal partnership. For example, African leaders or the African Union were not consulted on the agenda of the US-Africa Leaders Summit in 2022. This was also the case with the US Africa strategy.

This reflects the US’s traditional paternalistic relationship with Africa.

Biden will visit Angola in December – his only African visit as president. A much more encouraging message of equal partnership would have come across if, for example, the US-Africa Leaders Summit had been held at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia. Biden would then have been able to engage with African leaders on the continent early in his term.

There are a number of positive indicators of Biden’s commitment to repairing relations with Africa.

August 2022: The first tangible step was through the US strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa. This saw a shift in emphasis from great power politics (vis-à-vis China and Russia in Africa) and Trump’s America First diplomacy, to one of mutual respect and partnership (at least on paper) under Biden.

Priorities included promoting open societies, delivering democratic and security dividends, promoting pandemic recovery and economic opportunity, and supporting the climate agenda.

December 2022: The US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington DC was attended by 49 African leaders three months after the publication of the Africa Strategy. The focus was on strengthening ties with African partners, based on principles of mutual respect and shared interests and values.

Biden pledged $55 billion in investments through 2025 to achieve goals aligned with shared priorities. The US would have allocated 80 percent of these funds.

The US used the summit to formally announce its support for the African Union’s membership of the G20. This was achieved when the AU officially joined the G20 as a permanent member in 2023.

November 2023: Biden received Angolan President João Lourenço at the White House during an official visit. They discussed cooperation in the fields of economics, security, energy, transportation, telecommunications, agriculture and space.

May 2024: Kenyan President William Ruto’s state visit was the first by an African leader in more than fifteen years.

September 2024: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced U.S. support for Africa to gain two permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council.

FinallyBiden’s visit to Angola, scheduled for the first week of December, would be the first by a US president since 2015.

It is possible to see serious flaws in the US approach to Africa, contrary to expectations of an equal partnership.

First, the US has tried to undermine African power by pressuring African countries to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many African countries chose not to join.

Second, it seems at first glance commendable that the US is defending two seats for Africa on the Security Council. But the lack of veto power perpetuates power imbalances between Africa and the current permanent members of the Security Council – the US, France, Britain, Russia and China.

The question again is how equal the partnership will be if Africa will be a junior member of the Security Council.

Thirdly, there has been a lack of joint agenda setting. African countries have not contributed to the US-Africa strategy or to the US-Africa leadership summit.

The failure to consult African leaders, institutions and civil society on the continent’s own priorities reflects the same old practice of imposing priorities on African states. It appears to be a continuation of the usual passing of American national interests to African interests.

Fourth, there have been challenges in implementing what is set out in the US strategy for sub-Saharan Africa. These include inadequate allocation of resources.

Fifth, the Biden administration has used the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) as diplomatic pressure on African countries. For example, in October 2023 it announced the removal of Uganda, Niger, Gabon and the Central African Republic from the beneficiary countries.

The government previously removed Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. These countries were removed from Agoa for not complying with U.S. human rights and political demands.

Between February and March 2024, the US Congress also considered the US-South Africa Bilateral Relations Bill, which risks excluding South Africa from Agoa due to Pretoria’s position on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Finally, the fact that Biden is only visiting Africa in the final days of his presidency indicates that Africa is not a priority. The fact that only one African head of state has received a state visit to Washington reinforces this line of thinking.

If the US is serious about an equal partnership, it should not treat Africa as an afterthought. It must always consult African states when shaping policies that affect them and the continent.

By Christopher Isike (Director, African Center for the Study of the United States, University of Pretoria) and Samuel Oyewole
(Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Political Science, University of Pretoria)

Ruth Kasanga, a postgraduate student in the Department of Political Science and research assistant at the African Center for the Study of the United States, University of Pretoria, contributed to this article.