close
close

Powys train crash: Investigators release initial findings

Powys train crash: Investigators release initial findings

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has released its initial findings into the train crash Powys.

On Monday, October 21, 2024, 1J25 6:31 PM Shrewsbury Unpleasant Aberystwyth service collided with the 7:09 p.m Machynlleth to the Shrewsbury service just outside the Talerddig loop in Powys.

One person died and four others were seriously injured in the collision, while eleven others required hospital treatment.

In the days following the collision, RAIB worked to investigate the collision, before releasing the site and trains back to Network Rail on Wednesday 23 October.

The preliminary investigation found that the 1J25 was scheduled to stop at the Talerddig loop to allow the 1S71 to pass, and that the train’s driver had correctly applied the service brake as it approached the loop.

Talerddig collision
Talerddig clash // Credit: RAIB

However, approximately 40 seconds after the first braking action, the On Train Data Recorder registered that emergency braking was requested.

This requirement remained until the collision occurred.

The RAIB says there is conflicting evidence regarding the speed of the trains before the collision, but says initial analysis says the 1J25 was traveling at a speed of between 25 and 40 km/h and the 1S71 at a speed of around 10 km/hour.

Investigations revealed that at several locations on the approach to the Talerddig loop rail adhesion was low, and inspection of the sanding equipment fitted to 1J25 revealed that the hoses were blocked and unable to drain sand.

The RAIB has therefore said that its full investigation will include the following points:

  • the actions of those involved and all factors that may have influenced them
  • the level of wheel-rail adhesion present from the approach to the Talerddig loop to the point of impact
  • the status and performance of the braking, wheel-slip protection and abrasion systems on train 1J25
  • the behavior of both trains during and after the collision
  • Transport for Wales‘ policy regarding low wheel-rail adhesion and how it managed the risk of low adhesion on the Cambrian line
  • Network Rail’s policy on low wheel-to-rail adhesion and how it managed the risk of low adhesion on the Cambrian line
  • the processes used to assess and manage the risk of exceedance on the Cambrian line
  • all relevant underlying factors, including any actions taken in response to previous relevant safety recommendations.