Where America and India will meet will differ

Two tweets from Prime Minister Narendra Modi are evidence of the Indian government’s clear desire to deepen the relationship between the United States (US) and India on top of and beyond an architecture for diplomacy that was reimagined in February 2020, during the then President Donald Trump. Trump’s state visit to India. Between a ‘Namaste Trump’ meeting in Ahmedabad, where the 45th US President declared that America ‘should be India’s most important defense partner(s),’ and formal engagements in New Delhi, negotiators from both sides posted content that would mark this crucial relationship floats under a new syntax: the Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership (CGSP).

The CGSP was highlighted in Modi’s tweet congratulating Trump on winning the US elections to become the 47th US president. Prime Minister Modi was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the newly-elected president after he finished just four minutes ahead of French President Emmanuel Macron. Prime Minister Modi’s tweet went out with a set of four photos of the two leaders sharing moments of cheerfulness. Similar tweets from the past congratulating world leaders on winning elections are text-based. These signals may seem trivial, but they are not. Apparently, the Prime Minister has sent a clear message: the Indian government is more than willing to work with the new US administration.

The second tweet, following a phone call with Trump – just hours after he declared himself the winner – underscored the importance of deepening cooperation “in technology, defense, energy, space” and other sectors. In 2020, when the CGSP was announced, a “long-term and practical cooperation” in the technology field covered some lines in a joint statement.

Fast forward to September 2024, when Prime Minister Modi and President Joe Biden met in Delaware. The language underlying the technology and defense cooperation ambition takes up most of the outcome document. It is fair to say that these lines of cooperation have been placed under a relatively new and innovative diplomatic structure called the India-US Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which was inaugurated in January 2023.

The message seems clear again. For me it goes something like this: 2020 has created a frame of reference to further deepen ties. A lot has happened since then. The ambition for cooperation in critical technology has deepened. But there is still much to be achieved. In short, Trump’s victory provides a timely and much-needed opportunity to recall the fervor that led to the formulation of the CGSP – for two democracies to work toward “strategic convergence” in the Indo-Pacific and beyond; and at the same time the need to build on new initiatives in key technologies.

Much has been written about the expected problems of Trump’s fixation on tariffs and its potential impact on trade with India; the instability that can be expected from the dismantling of multilateralism, if the 45th Presidency is anything to go by; and the possibilities of ending the war in Europe, leaving Russia with a piece of Ukrainian territory. There isn’t much more to say about these matters at this point. Based on Prime Minister Modi’s two tweets, as I see it, there are two sets of issues of bilateral importance that will and should drive the need for change and action under the Trump presidency.

The first has to do with the issue of strategic convergence. Therefore, there is currently a strategic dialogue gap in the US-India relationship. Much of this has to do with rapidly evolving strategic and operational advances with intended and unintended geopolitical consequences.

Think about all that is going on right now that is clearly shaping various aspects of the India-US relationship – America’s “strategic channel” with China; India’s cautious renewed engagement with China, following the announcement of an “agreement” on “patrolling arrangements” along the Line of Actual Control over the India-China border areas; Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Kazan during the recently concluded Brics Summit – the first in over five years; the US Treasury Department imposes sanctions on “individuals” and “entities” engaged in “providing advanced technology to Russia,” including 19 Indian companies; the crushing war in Ukraine; and the lingering fallout from an alleged assassination plot on American soil.

These strategic moves, if you can call them that, are inherently contradictory and at the same time interconnected. At some level, this progress in both countries is shaped by silos, which is the nature of bureaucratic politics. For a US official sitting in the Treasury Building on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington DC, sanctioning Indian entities as part of an effort involving hundreds of others around the world is merely an administrative exercise. For those in India, these formulaic decisions are seen as further limiting India’s age-old relationship with Russia.

For those in America determined to challenge China’s technological hegemony, the call in India to increase Chinese investment and cultivate other cooperative relationships with Russia still seems at odds with the drive behind the determination to innovate together and strategically technologies – one of the directors of the iCET. How both countries deal with China while opening strategic space for each other is another area of ​​much-needed discussion. In short, there is an urgent need for a serious and honest dialogue.

Finally, regarding iCET, there is clear evidence of a measurable impact on all efforts identified by the Biden administration and the Indian government. Importantly, the foundations of a decentralized innovation ecosystem have been deepened in areas such as space, semiconductors, defense and increasingly biotechnology.

This must continue. In addition, there will need to be a clear discussion about how the Trump administration wants to deal with artificial intelligence (AI) and the newly established AI safety institutes. Trump’s appointees may want to ban the term “iCET,” as expected. It is up to India and those in the Biden administration who are committed to what the iCET includes across all technology sectors to ensure that the transition team is aware of the benefits for both countries.

The lines of cooperation and strategic disagreement outlined above provide the basis for the renewal of the CGSP, while at the same time stepping up efforts to remain at the forefront of strategic technology cooperation, which remains another avenue for India to achieve self-reliance .

Rudra Chaudhuri is director of Carnegie India. The opinions expressed are personal