There is no time to waste in delaying NGAD if the Air Force is to meet the China challenge

Air War, Congress

Forget the Chinese. There are days when the Air Force seems like its own worst enemy.

After a decade of priority investments and confident leadership support, the Air Force is beginning to worry about the NGAD, the sixth-generation fighter that is set to replace the F-22 as the centerpiece of air dominance. Just this week, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall expressed new concerns about the cost, design, and engine, before suggesting that the Air Force is mired in “tradeoffs.”

This is a significant risk. The Army’s entire next-generation plan—the Collaborative Strike Fighter, the B-21 bomber, the modernized tankers, and the F-35s—was developed on the assumption that a sixth-generation fighter would be deployed in the 2030s. Removing the NGAD aircraft from the program while the program is being overhauled jeopardizes the joint force’s air dominance.

It seems that Kendall’s statements can only be justified by two reasons. First, it is the budget. Second, the Air Force has been swept up in a wave of enthusiasm for the CCA and all its promises, which is beginning to dilute the role of the NGAD aircraft.

In any case, moving away from the NGAD could prove perilous.

The manned component of NGAD has been an Air Force priority for more than a decade. Occasionally appearing under different names such as Penetrating Combat Aircraft, the mission has remained much the same: penetrate at longer ranges, using all possible stealth, speed, and altitude to keep the most difficult targets at bay. NGAD’s manned fighter would replace the F-22, a brilliant design from the 1980s that first flew as the YF-22 in 1990.

NGAD was structured from the start to include a new sixth-generation manned fighter, drones, and weapons in a “family of systems.” And real progress has been made: Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall acknowledged that a secret X-plane program had flown technology demonstrators for NGAD before 2020.

Other officials have been keen to drum up excitement about the effort. For example, the entire NGAD program is intended to “deploy capabilities on a scale and breadth that we haven’t seen in decades,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Scott Jobe told a Mitchell Institute audience last year. There have been tactical discussions about docking and undocking the CCAs and the NGAD aircraft based on combat conditions. And, of course, a plan to award the contract in 2024.

Then, as if by magic, Kendall and Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. David Allvin offered their hesitant comments. Both men pointed to the budget as the problem, and there are reasons for that: The B-21 is not a cheap initiative, and the significant increase in the cost of the Sentinel ICBM means the service has had to adjust its priorities.

But there is also a sense that renewed enthusiasm for the CCA is about to devour the NGAD plane.

There is no doubt that CCAs will be a bold new addition to the USAF force mix. Approximately 1,000 to 3,000 drones are planned to fly with the F-35, F-15EX, and NGAD, performing missions ranging from intelligence to strike to electronic warfare to decoys. Commanders, from the air operations center to the flight chief, can select and adjust autonomy levels. CCAs build on a strong history of working with towed decoys and other ISR drones in combat operations over the years. Yet their use as a major force element has not been tested in a major fight.

CCAs are particularly interesting because they fulfill many missions and, since they are still in development, they can be used by anyone in a war game. CCAs also allow the Air Force to move away from fixed and vulnerable runways, because some CCAs can be launched from smaller mobile batteries.

There is no doubt, however, that increased use of CCAs – in all their forms – carries risks.

Despite much analysis, it is too early to predict how CFACCs and flight leaders will use CCAs in what INDOPACOM likes to call “the hellscape.” And it is too early to abandon NGAD with so many operational questions unanswered.

To illustrate, divide the operational risk analysis into three cases: hell, inside China, and the second possibility.

Hellscape is an INDOPACOM slogan describing a mass of unmanned systems defending China in the Western Pacific. Admiral Samuel Paparo recently said, “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities so that I can make their lives absolutely miserable for a month, which will give me time for the rest of this.”

In the Hellscape, one can assume that aerial drones like the CCA use their secure data links to each other to create a network of targeting and tracking information that outsmarts China and its radio frequency spectrum interference and can also direct American firepower. On paper, this sounds great.

However, a subtle analytical dilemma arises. When CCAs and other unmanned systems are so numerous, they tend to minimize the role of any other “blue” or friendly force element, such as NGAD aircraft. This can lead planners to use NGAD aircraft against fewer targets. Consequently, in a war game, NGAD aircraft will appear to have made a smaller contribution to the overall outcome of the campaign. The emphasis on the involvement of CCAs in the fight can inadvertently overshadow NGAD.

Certainly, the hellscape would be even more intense with an NGAD aircraft on patrol. Regardless, other scenarios amplify the need for NGAD.

Without NGAD, operational risks multiply. For example, the Air Force has not demonstrated that CCAs without NGAD can undertake all the repeated penetration attacks required for certain target sets. Targets located inside the enemy may require repeated strikes, whether they are the space launch sites on Hainan Island, China’s five land-based laser weapon bases, or a threat lurking in the mountains of North Korea or Iran.

Finally, given the current China-Russia-Iran-North Korea alliances, the Air Force could be forced to fight in two or more places at once—or for much longer than expected. Wars have recently lasted much longer than expected, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, not to mention Ukraine and Gaza. Friendly forces have seen their target lists grow longer and have called in ever-greater numbers of forces. If this happens over the Taiwan Strait, the United States could find itself in a “back to the future” situation, having to roll back its defenses and gain access so that joint forces can win a longer battle. An NGAD aircraft could indeed prove very useful if the war drags on.

The Air Force must also consider maintaining confidence in the men and women behind this long-secret program. Senior Air Force leaders often tout their close partnership with industry. Failure to award the NGAD in a timely manner would shock and disappoint this talented aerospace workforce and impact the companies that have been eagerly awaiting an award.

Senior Air Force officials have repeatedly said that the service is outdated, that the China-Russia-Iran threat is here, now. That means now is not the time to change designs.

The Air Force and Congress have a lot to consider, but now is not the time to take risks by eliminating NGAD.

Dr. Rebecca Grant is a Senior Fellow and Vice President of the Lexington Institute