Will Ukraine’s Incursion Into Russia Change the Trajectory of the War?

Less than a month ago, Ukraine launched a surprise incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, overwhelming Russian border defenses and taking hundreds of soldiers captive. The move has boosted Ukrainian spirits during a year in which Russia has made steady gains on the battlefield. Vladimir Putin has not responded with any significant counterassaults—surely to the relief of Ukraine’s Western allies, who had worried that any Ukrainian attacks on Russian soil could be met with a devastating response. But Putin’s next moves remain uncertain, as does the effect this attack will have on the Russian public’s perceptions of the war, which is now in its third year.

Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, founded, in 2018, R. Politik, a political-analysis firm, which is based in France. I recently reached out to Stanovaya, who is more comfortable corresponding in English via e-mail; we exchanged a few rounds of questions and answers. Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, is below. In it, we discuss whether Putin truly has any red lines, why the Ukrainian incursion may be less of a threat to Putin than it appears, and the odds for any sort of negotiated end to the war.

There have been many events—economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, initial Ukrainian successes on the battlefield—that have made people think Putin might need to change course. He hasn’t. Do you have any reason to think this latest incursion is different?

I believe that sanctions and broader “anti-Russian” policies, along with Western efforts to arm Ukraine and support its military actions—even if not universally agreed upon in the West—only reinforce Putin’s determination to destroy Ukraine in its current state. From his perspective, these actions validate his decision to start the war, and convince him that he must persist, exploiting what he perceives as growing internal divisions and contradictions in the West while waiting for Kyiv to fall. He has no intention of softening his approach and will not agree to talks under pressure. Putin is more convinced than ever that Ukraine is doomed and that the West is on the brink of tectonic political changes that will make his objectives easier to achieve.

However, the situation is different for the Russian elite. If, for any reason, Putin were to disappear tomorrow, many within the Russian elite might wish to withdraw from the conflict. The main obstacle is not so much the terms of a potential peace (although that is important) but, rather, the consequences Russia would face for war crimes and the hostilities inflicted on Ukraine and its people. Regardless of future domestic political shifts, the key question for the Russian elite is: What is the price of concessions? The fear that such concessions could be detrimental to the Russian state is currently so significant that it hampers any serious consideration of a peace process.

I want to emphasize that I am referring specifically to those members of the elite who are actively involved in the ideological and military aspects of the “war machine.” I have received considerable criticism for suggesting that no one in Moscow is actively seeking an exit strategy and that they are prepared to continue the war indefinitely.

To be more precise, those who genuinely want the war to stop and are willing to consider concessions are not in a position to express their opinions, let alone take action. Politically, they do not exist—at least for now.

The calculation behind this incursion by the Ukrainians seems to be that raising the stakes for Putin might actually force Moscow to the negotiating table, or allow negotiations to occur on better footing. Are you saying that’s not plausible?

Given the current reality, Putin’s stance on ending the conflict is far from flexible. In his logic, the Kremlin might become more “generous” with its demands only if and when Ukraine admits defeat—and, crucially, if the West either does not intervene or, better yet, encourages such an outcome. The more intense the hostility between Russia and Ukraine, the harder Putin’s position will become. Many believe that this is merely the image Putin wants to project, but unfortunately, he genuinely believes it. To Putin, Russia simply cannot be defeated (which is why he regularly reminds the world about its nuclear arsenal) so he will only enter negotiations from a position of strength—unless the regime changes.

Some may argue that Russia was much more vulnerable in the spring of 2022 and yet still engaged in talks, accepting significant concessions. For instance, Putin agreed to postpone discussions on the status of Crimea, annexed in 2014, for several years. He also recently admitted that he was then ready to withdraw from parts of Ukraine that connect to Crimea, if other conditions were met. At that time, Russian forces had to withdraw from the Kyiv and Chernihiv areas, and Putin appeared to be acting from a position of weakness.

However, if you look at the entirety of Russia’s demands at that time, including those that were not accepted by Ukraine (which Putin expected to secure later) the draft agreement still safeguarded most of Russia’s priorities. When we consider the full scope of those demands, they do not significantly differ from its current position, with one exception concerning the two regions—Kherson and Zaporozhye—that were annexed later in 2022, along with Donetsk and Luhansk.

At no point during the war has Putin abandoned his paramount aspiration: to change Ukraine politically, insuring that it becomes neutral and “friendly.” On other matters, he has been willing to negotiate. If Kyiv accepts a neutral status, a set of political demands (secured in a reformed constitution) and guaranteed unobstructed Russian access to Crimea, Putin might become more flexible on territorial issues.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that the West or Ukraine should entertain Putin’s political demands, which I believe are unrealistic. My aim is to outline Putin’s reasoning as it currently stands, to better understand his potential next steps.

Tea Times recently reported that Grigory A. Yavlinsky, “a longtime Russian politician who met with Mr. Putin last October to promote the idea of ​​a cease-fire, said in an interview from Moscow that there had been hope in the Russian capital that ‘the fighting would stop this year.’ ” The circumstances of the recent incursion, he said, “have lowered all these chances, they have removed them from the agenda.” But you don’t agree that there had been hope in the Russian capital before this?

Let’s be clear—many people in Moscow, and across Russia, genuinely hope for the war to end. There is widespread speculation about “secret” talks between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and the US There is a strong element of wishful thinking that something might change soon, perhaps within months, simply because neither Russia nor Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to decisively win the war. Russians live in a narrative where the West is the aggressor, Ukraine is merely the battlefield, and Ukrainians are seen as tools of anti-Russian forces. Who wouldn’t want the aggression against Russia to stop? If you ask Putin, he would claim to be against a war.

Several factors fuel these “peace” expectations. First, it is becoming increasingly controversial to approve large-scale military aid to Ukraine. Simultaneously, Russia is betting on a political shift to the right in European countries, and there is also hope that Trump will win the upcoming US election, which would make the term “collective West” less relevant in the context of the war.