USS Forrestal: The Crazy Story of a Navy Aircraft Carrier Burning

Summary and key points: The 1967 fire aboard the USS Forrestal, America’s first supercarrier, remains one of the most catastrophic naval disasters in history. On July 29, while stationed off the coast of Vietnam, a Zuni rocket was accidentally fired from an F-4 Phantom, hitting an A-4 Skyhawk piloted by future Senator John McCain.

-The impact caused a fuel leak and fire, leading to massive explosions of obsolete 1,000-pound bombs.

-The fire destroyed 21 aircraft, injured 161 people and killed 134 sailors.

-The tragedy exposed critical flaws in damage control procedures and crew training, prompting the U.S. Navy to review its safety protocols and implement more effective firefighting strategies across its fleet.

USS Forrestal Fire of 1967: The Disaster That Changed Naval Safety

The 1967 fire aboard the nation’s first supercarrier, the USS Forrestal (CVA-59), resonated in history. It set the stage for future damage control operations throughout the U.S. Navy. The incident destroyed 21 aircraft, injured 161 personnel, and killed 134 sailors.

USS Forrestal was the first post-World War II aircraft carrier designed to accommodate jet aircraft. She entered service in 1955 and served until 1993.

It was carrying a crew of 5,400 and was on its first combat deployment at the time of the fire. It had arrived at Yankee Station off the coast of Vietnam when the disaster struck on July 29, 1967.

Twenty-seven of its aircraft were conducting pre-flight checks with their crews before taking off to strike North Vietnamese targets. A Zuni rocket on an F-4 accidentally went off, hitting an A-4 Skyhawk without detonating. The impact caused a fuel leak on the A-4, piloted by future Senator John S. McCain III.

USS Forrestal aircraft carrier: Fuel burn ignites 1,000-pound bombs

The fuel ignited, causing one or two 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 bombs, dating from the Korean War, to fall onto the deck.

“According to the investigation report, the old bombs that caused so much death and destruction were manufactured in 1953, filled with Composition B explosive, and had been stored “for years” in Okinawa or Guam. Unlike modern explosives, “Comp B” became unstable over time, especially in hot, humid storage conditions. At least these weapons were 14 years old and had been stored in the open in the hot, humid climate of the islands,” wrote journalist J.A. Caella in the August 2022 issue of Naval History magazine.

High winds blew across the flight deck, spreading the flames. A 450 kg bomb exploded about 90 seconds after the fire started, causing 160,000 litres of volatile kerosene to spill from the fuel tanks and fuel tanks, which were destroyed by the explosions and shrapnel. At least seven of the 450 kg bombs exploded after the fire was over.

“Seven holes were pierced in the deck by explosions of 340, 225 and 450 kg bombs. Rockets and 20 mm shells were fired on the deck and ejection seats were fired into the air,” states the report of the “Informal Investigation Committee” on the Forrestal incident.

The burning fuel spread to the hangar deck and then throughout the ship’s interior.

The ship alerted the crew to the command post or their battle station. The damage control team closed all interior hatches of the ship to prevent the spread of fire, smoke and water from firefighting equipment.

The incident caused $72 million in damages at the time, or about $658.9 million in 2023 dollars. It took nearly two years of repairs to return the Forrestal to service.

It took 24 hours to extinguish the fires on the Forrestal with support from other ships in its battle group.

Damage Control Course

An official review of the incident found that damage control procedures in place at the time of the accident were not coordinated.

“Some of the burning fuel was spread by untrained fire crews using water on a Class B fuel fire, in some cases carrying away foam laid by other crews and reigniting the fire. The loss of life and incapacitation of the entire specialized firefighting team during the initial explosion had a critical impact,” a 2017 report from the Naval History and Heritage Command said. “By the end of World War II, thanks to lessons learned during the war, most sailors aboard ships had received training to fight shipboard fires. By 1967, the U.S. Navy had returned to the Japanese model at Midway with specialized, highly trained damage control and firefighting teams, but most of the crew was untrained.”

The report continues: “This probably saved money, but the outcome of the crisis was heroic, but the uncoordinated, often ineffective and counterproductive efforts of untrained teams led to unnecessary additional deaths and injuries.”

The Forrestal incident led to an overhaul of the Navy’s damage control procedures and a reexamination of ship design.

About the author: John Rossomando

John Rossomando is a defense and counterterrorism analyst. He was a senior counterterrorism analyst at the Investigative Project on Terrorism for eight years. His work has been featured in numerous publications including The American Thinker, The National Interest, National Review Online, Daily Wire, Red Alert Politics, CNSNews.com, The Daily Caller, Human Events, Newsmax, The American Spectator, TownHall.com, and Crisis Magazine. He also served as senior editor of The Bulletin, a 100,000-circulation daily newspaper in Philadelphia, and received the Associated Press’ first Pennsylvania Editor’s Award for his reporting.

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