What can we still learn from the Cuban missile crisis?

4 minute read

Richard F. Keevey
| Special to USA TODAY Network

Both the process and results of public decision-making are fundamental to the proper functioning of the government. Ask the right questions; accurately access available information; surround decision makers with diverse, informed and experienced advisors; and exercising common sense when evaluating information are part of the process. All of these factors were evident during one of the most critical events in United States history.

October 2024 marks the 62nd anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis. These 13 days were the closest the world came to nuclear war. Decision-making in wartime is always difficult and fraught with challenges. In fact, it is the pinnacle of public decision-making. This was the case when the Soviet Union secretly introduced a small number of nuclear weapons into Cuba, with ships loaded with more nuclear weapons already bound for sea. Some might argue that it was President John F. Kennedy’s finest hour.

When an American military plane discovered the missiles, a major crisis erupted. Kennedy immediately formed a group of advisers — the so-called ExComm Committee — to consider a course of action, while keeping these deliberations confidential to avoid panic until all reasonable and appropriate options could be identified and considered.

Some of Kennedy’s advisers called for an immediate air strike and subsequent invasion of Cuba. This was also the president’s initial inclination, and in fact, he began to mobilize troops. Fortunately for the world, he continued with the deliberations. Kennedy decided instead on a naval blockade of Cuba, while also beginning secret negotiations and “back doors” with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

Ultimately, the crisis subsided when the Soviet ships carrying the additional missiles returned to blockade without incident and Khrushchev agreed to remove the existing missiles from Cuba. As part of the secret negotiations, the United States agreed to remove our Jupiter nuclear missiles located in Turkey, destined for the Soviet Union, and gave public assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba.

Actions before the disaster

In retrospect, the strategy used by Kennedy looks like a clear success. However, the outcome was not as rosy and uneventful as it may seem, as several incidents that developed along the way suggested that we were close to a nuclear disaster. A reckless decision by either side could have resulted in nuclear war. Consider the following situations:

The Central Intelligence Agency estimated that there were 15,000 Soviet troops in Cuba, but it was later revealed that there were 45,000 troops. Even more surprising, it was later determined that short-range tactical nuclear weapons had already been installed in Cuba. As such, any “preemptive” invasion of Cuba could have been disastrous.

A US military plane was shot down over Cuba during these days of clashes and deliberations. Military leaders believed that the political leadership in Moscow had authorized the shooting and our military pressed for a retaliatory response. In fact, Khrushchev did not authorize the action and was furious with his generals’ decision. However, and even more important, Kennedy rejected the advice of his military leaders and resisted an attack on Cuba.

On October 27, 1962, an American aircraft on a routine mission to keep an eye on Soviet nuclear tests inadvertently took a wrong turn over the North Pole and ended up in Soviet airspace. The Soviets sent MIG fighters to shoot down the aircraft. At the same time, the US command in Alaska embarked nuclear-armed fighter interceptors. Fortunately, our aircraft “escaped” Soviet airspace before any open military confrontation.

Some reflections

Presidential decision-making in times of war often occurs under a veil of secrecy and uncertainty that even the best intelligence cannot understand. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, in his article “Denial of What One Knows”, provides a useful taxonomy of knowledge, dividing it specifically into: “known-knowns” (things we know); “known unknowns” (things we are aware we don’t know); and “unknown unknowns” (things we don’t know, where we don’t recognize our ignorance). It is this last category that is the most dangerous and the easiest to ignore. Let us consider what was unknown during the confrontations and deliberations of the Cuban missile crisis.

In his book “Overconfidence and War,” Dominic Johnson coins the phrase “positive illusions,” whereby people a) consider themselves above average, b) demonstrate unrealistic optimism, c) display exaggerated bravado, d) assume that they have more control over situations than they actually have, and e) they underestimate the potential for action on the other side. Consider General Custer’s alleged cry at the battle of Little Big Horn: “Hurray boys, we got you”; General MacArthur’s belief that the Chinese would not intervene in Korea; and Khrushchev’s belief that the Soviet missiles planned for Cuba would not be discovered and the situation would be a fait accompli once they were operational.

Graham Allison, former Harvard professor and author of “The Essence of Decision Making,” argues that an effective way to avoid “positive illusions” is to have a wide range of opinions that are evaluated against reality. The different Ex-Comm participants (each with their own distinct roles and perspectives) all contributed to mitigating positive illusions.

How did the US prevail in the Cuban missile crisis?

Following the crisis, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy identified some important facts that contributed to a successful resolution, including:

maximize the time for decision-making and opponent responses,
inhibit initial response tendencies,
gather as much information as possible,
welcome a diversity of opinions,
use all available history and knowledge about the opponent,
ensure civilian control of the military,
deliberate carefully,
provide the adversary with a “salvage” way to fulfill its requirements, and
create safeguards against inadvertent escalation.

The result of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the realization that a nuclear holocaust was entirely possible. Fortunately, both Kennedy and Khrushchev abandoned any “positive illusions” they may have had, especially with regard to winning or even surviving a nuclear war.

A final note about Kennedy. If someone else had been president in October 1962, the outcome could have been very different. Kennedy derived his leadership abilities and common sense from his experiences, both before and during his time in the White House. His courage to survive was demonstrated when his PT-109 patrol boat was destroyed in World War II, and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961 taught him to be skeptical of the assurances of espionage experts. and military leadership.

Interestingly, in early 1962, Kennedy had just finished reading Barbara Tuchman’s classic story, “The Guns of August,” which details how Europe entered World War I, particularly the passage in which a German leader asks why this war hatched and receives the response “If only someone knew.” Although many public decisions are important, most do not have the significance of wartime decisions. The potential for disaster can be enormous, which places great weight on both the decision-making process and the results.

Richard F. Keevey held two presidential appointments as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of Defense and as CFO of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. He was appointed budget director by two New Jersey governors. He is currently a senior policy fellow at Rutgers University and a visiting professor at Princeton University. He served as executive director of a nuclear missile battery in Europe in the mid-1960s.