1000 days What open source data tells us about the evolution of the Russian war against Ukraine – Meduza

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November 19, 2024 will mark a thousand days since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine. From the beginning, Meduza analysts have collected and researched open source intelligence from the frontlines to deliver accurate information. reports about a war that the Kremlin has tried to censor. Our initial report, published just three days after the 2022 invasion, contained only 33 geolocated videos of Russian troop movements, verified by our team and other OSINT analysts. Today, after 153 updates, our maps contain more than 15,000 geolocated videos and serve as a detailed chronicle of the territories occupied by Russia and liberated by Ukraine. This wealth of data has allowed us to track the phases of the war and identify key trends over the course of the conflict. Here’s what we learned.

Before we delve into recent developments and calculate how many square kilometers of territory the Russian armed forces have conquered, it is useful to look at the overall picture from the beginning of Russian military aggression against Ukraine, starting with the annexation of Crimea. The graph below shows how many square kilometers of internationally recognized Ukrainian territory have been under the control of Russia or Russian-backed forces since 2014.

Because reliable data on territorial control in the Donbas during the heavy fighting of 2014-2015 and in Crimea is limited, the graph provides only two static snapshots:

  • The land area of ​​Crimea on March 26, 2014, when the Russian forces had actually done so secured control over the peninsula.
  • The territory of “” from September 16, 2014, when the Ukrainian authorities a law granting special self-government to these designated areas, effectively conceding that they were no longer under Kiev’s control.

The main takeaway from this graph is the minimal magnitude of changes on the frontlines over the past two years. The latest period of significant movement came when Russian forces withdrew from the west bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson region, followed by Ukraine’s counteroffensive at Balakliya and Kupyansk – a shift clearly visible in the graph. Since then, the conflict has devolved into a largely positional war, resembling the near standstill that characterized the years before the full-scale invasion. In fact, from February 24, 2023 to February 24, 2024, the total area controlled by both sides remained virtually unchanged, shifting by only about ten square kilometers (four square miles). Yet there are almost Russian casualties (and probably Ukrainian ones as well). doubled over the same period.

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This does not mean that the events on the front lines of the past two years have been less consequential than in phases characterized by more visible territorial shifts on the front lines. Instead, it underlines that meaningful analysis of territorial shifts is only possible when similar phases of the war are compared. It makes no sense to compare land gains during quick battles with what happens in a prolonged war of attrition. For a clearer analysis, it is best to focus on the period between late 2022 and early 2023, when the front entered a nearly two-year stalemate. The status quo only recently began to shift, and not in Ukraine’s favor.

Russia now controls almost 19 percent of Ukrainian territory

The graph below shows the progress of both the Ukrainian and Russian armed forces, as well as the overall balance of territorial control, showing the difference between the areas controlled by both sides. This breakdown is important because even if the overall balance appears stable, both sides can still make significant gains on several fronts. Alternatively, all the shifts could stem from the progress of just one side, as has been the case with Russia’s offensive operations in recent months.

The graph clearly confirms a number of important points:

  • The pace of Russian progress in recent weeks is the fastest since early 2023, with gains of up to 300 square kilometers (115 square miles) per week.
  • Similar rates of territorial conquest have been observed only twice during this period: when Ukrainian forces entered Russia’s Kursk region in early August 2024, and when Russian forces captured positions near Kharkov and Vovchansk in May of the same year.
  • However, these operations had markedly different consequences for territorial control. Despite Ukraine’s rapid progress near Russia’s Sudzha, the operation has not slowed Russia’s long-term advance in the Donbas. As a result, the overall balance quickly shifted back in Russia’s favor within just three weeks.
  • Ukraine’s last significant gains before the Kursk operation came in late 2023 and early 2024, when Kiev attempted to counter Russian advances around Avdiivka by gaining a foothold on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River near the village of Krynky in the Kherson region and launched counterattacks to the south. from Bakhmut and near Horlivka.

A separate graph, showing the total area of ​​occupied mainland Ukraine rather than the pace of progress, provides a clearer picture of the broader phases of the war:

  • The steady increase in Russian-occupied territory from spring to June 2023 during the Battle of Bakhmut.
  • A sharper reverse trend was associated with Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Zaporizhia in June 2023.
  • The increasing Russian gains from November 2023, which allowed Russian forces to take back all the territory (in total area) that Ukraine had liberated in the summer.
  • A pronounced downward peak was associated with the Ukrainian operation in the Kursk region.

Since early 2023, Russian forces have expanded their control over Ukrainian territory by 2,067 square kilometers (798 sq mi), from 85,700 to 86,800 square kilometers, or 33,089 to 33,513 square kilometers (excluding Crimea). Most of this increase has occurred in the last six months.

Including Crimea, Russian forces control 18.8 percent of Ukrainian territory by mid-November 2024. Ukraine currently owns 650 square kilometers (about 250 square miles) in Russia’s Kursk region.

Putin is not yet close to realizing his (current) territorial demands

At the outset of the all-out war, the Kremlin framed its objectives with vague terms like “denazification” and “demilitarization,” leaving room for virtually any outcome that could be declared a victory. But in June 2024, ahead of a peace summit organized by Kiev in Switzerland, Vladimir Putin issued a more concrete ultimatum: demanding the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the entire territory of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.

Even though the Ukrainian army has suffered serious setbacks in recent months, this demand seems highly unrealistic – especially considering that much of the Kherson region lies on the western bank of the Dnipro River and crossing it is a total would require collapse of Ukrainian defenses.

If Moscow’s territorial objectives remain unchanged, the graph below suggests that the Russian military has made only limited progress in achieving them.

Currently, Russia controls 78 percent of the territory of these four Ukrainian regions. At the beginning of 2023, when the number of Russian casualties was about six times lower than today, that figure was 76 percent. The biggest Russian gains have been in Donetsk, where the occupied territory has increased from 57 percent to 65 percent of the region’s total area since the beginning of 2023.

More victims does not mean more ground is covered

Meduza’s data clearly illustrates how the nature of the war has changed many times in the thousand days since the full-scale invasion began. Territorial shifts undoubtedly involve losses in manpower and equipment, but in complex ways.

Russian military deaths in 2023 were double those in 2022, and there were weekly personnel losses in 2024 hit record levels of 200 to 250 soldiers per day. But even if the number of casualties increases, the front can remain virtually stable. Conversely, if this stability gives way to a more maneuver-driven phase of the conflict, it does not necessarily mean that there will be greater losses.

Keeping this in mind, it is still possible to compare loss rates and ground gains over short periods of time, although the insights from such comparisons are limited. Still, some patterns emerge. For example, the heavy fighting around Bakhmut in early 2023 coincided with a sharp increase in both Russian casualties and territorial gains. Another striking pattern is the increase in equipment losses that accompanied the Russian advance at Vovchansk, north of Kharkov, and at Ocheretyne, north of Avdiivka.

It is also important to consider that information about territorial control can often be confirmed within days through geolocation data, while reports of equipment losses – and especially personnel losses – can lag behind for several months. As a result, recent loss figures are almost certainly underreported. Over time, it may become clear that Russia’s current record territorial gains were accompanied by equally large losses in troops and military equipment.

Falling dominoes As Ukraine’s position in Kursk shrinks, the Russian army captures cities in the Donbas that were once far out of reach

Falling dominoes As Ukraine’s position in Kursk shrinks, the Russian army captures cities in the Donbas that were once far out of reach