Defending democracy in the streets of Bolivia

Bolivian journalist Fernando Molina discusses the racist roots of Bolivia’s 2019 right-wing coup and how the country’s movements defended democracy from the streets.

Last June, armored trucks and contending military officers once again filled Murillo Square in the center of La Paza during a failed coup attempt against Bolivian President Luis Arce. The right-wing takeover was reminiscent of 2019, when another coup successfully overthrew the government of President Evo Morales, leading to massacres and widespread repression. The 2019-2020 coup government of Jeanine Áñez was ultimately defeated by the country’s social movements and the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS).

Throughout these events and up to the present day, Bolivian journalist and analyst Fernando Molina has written incisive commentaries and articles that help readers navigate the country’s tumultuous times. Molina is the author of numerous books, including Racism and power in Bolivia And Bolivian thinking on natural resourcesIn 2012 he won the Ibero-American Journalism Award of the King of Spain. He writes regularly for The Country And New Society on the news of the region.

In this interview, Molina discusses the classist and racist roots of the 2019 coup against the government of Evo Morales, how the MAS party defeated the coup government at the polls, and how the country’s social movements defended democracy in the streets.

Benjamin Dangl: To begin with, how do you explain the support for Áñez and the movement against Evo and the MAS in 2019-2020? Can you explain which sectors participated in it and why?

Fernando Molina: I call it a counterrevolutionary insurrection of the bourgeoisie, although it is not the bourgeoisie per se but rather what replaces the bourgeoisie in countries like Bolivia, which is a more politicized and more educated middle class.

These groups begin to distance themselves from Evo Morales from the beginning, even though some voted for him to punish neoliberalism (notably Sánchez de Lozada). But it soon becomes clear that there is a division between a popular, working-class and indigenous majority that supported the changes and a group that pollsters call “the frightened,” those who are afraid of change, as I said, even though some of them voted for Morales.

The core of this group is in Santa Cruz, because for various reasons the region has an elite that has hegemonic control of the region, based on the identity of cruciferous vegetablesThey don’t feel indigenous at all, they are rather racist. Crosses Bolivians feel different from others, direct descendants of the Spanish, and this miscegenation has been absorbed by what is Spanish. They feel whiter and more Western than us. This elite has also become richer, especially since 1952 (the year of the National Revolution), and constitutes the core of this Bolivian middle class. This conglomerate has radically opposed Evo Morales as his policies have developed.

Morales had a period of economic prosperity, and the opposition remained rather silent, but two things were always present. On the one hand, a sense of national tragedy, because we called ourselves plurinationals, that is, indigenous, and for them it was tragic. They felt that they were not included in this country, that they were no longer theirs, because they were losing the power that they had always had. They expected Morales to be similar to other processes like the 1952 Revolution, which after a while allowed the elite to join in.

But Morales came from below; even if there were spaces where the elite had the right to do business, in general they did not have access to them. So they lost a political space of ideological, cultural and educational capital that they had, the state. This space was very useful for them to do business; they also did business through the state.

The Plurinational State was a tragedy for them and they felt like they were losing their relevance. So they became more anti-MAS and more explicit about their racism, which was previously more hidden, it was not a problem, or rather it was a private problem, but Morales makes it a public problem, which generates a lot of reactions.

The “fearful” go from 25 to 30%, who sometimes voted for the MAS, to a stronger opposition; they are never homogeneous and are always fragmented. Finally, Morales makes the mistake of giving them space while he tries to get re-elected (through a national referendum in 2016). These groups win the referendum in 2016, because they have grown enough; they are also lucky – they ran a better campaign than Evo.

And at that time, the country was in a pretty good balance, but when Evo tried to get re-elected (in 2019)… Phew! Things changed. That is, the left-wing popular movement lost strength and cohesion because of those mistakes, and some groups separated, like the miners of Potosí, sectors of the COB (Bolivian Workers’ Central, national union), teachers… That mistake created the conditions for the arrival of Áñez, and of course those who supported her were from Santa Cruz, and the elites of all the departments.

During the coup, the situation became serious: patrols were carried out against the indigenous people. They came back to power and expelled the indigenous people. This translated into brutality against the MAS, because of all the previous years in which they were unable to take revenge for what they were supposed to suffer. What did they want? What was the counterrevolution for? To eliminate the Plurinational State and return to the Republic, that is, to a monocultural government, and to return as much as possible to neoliberalism.

Racism plays a fundamental role. It is because it disconnects the elite from the MAS groups, which are very different realities, that they feel they have lost their place in the country. That is why they start by offending the indigenous population. Áñez’s attacks against the MAS were also attacks against the indigenous people so that they “learn the lesson.”

BD: Regarding the MAS and this period, could you explain why and how the MAS presidential candidate, Luis Arce, and Vice President David Choquehuanca won the 2020 general elections?

FM: When Áñez came to power, a racist, corrupt, authoritarian and violent leader, not only against the MAS but also against its bases, a fantastic phenomenon of cohesion occurred. It was a time of courage and struggle. It was Arce’s victory: the popular bloc returned and now represents a larger sector than the elitist bloc. There was a movement of cohesion again, as happened in the neoliberal era.

Another factor is that they ran a good campaign because they had a very good candidate for the time, which was a period of economic crisis due to the pandemic. Arce was an economist (in the Morales administration) and he had a period of economic prosperity. So they ran a good campaign. At that time, something stronger than Morales happened, which was a vote of punishment against the elite, “we don’t want this to happen again”, and so (the MAS) got 55% of the vote.

BD: What was the role of the movements demanding elections in August 2020?

FM: Yes, the fact is that, as often happens in Bolivia, the Áñez government was a transitional government, but first it tried to rebuild neoliberalism in Bolivia. They had three months to try to rebuild the nation, right? And above all, they wanted to do business, get offices, etc. And then the pandemic came…

The pandemic gave Bolivia the opportunity to watch (the Áñez government) for a year, while they were governing. The pandemic gives the MAS the opportunity to consolidate itself as an alternative to what was happening, which was a disaster. Áñez and his ministers want to take advantage of this opportunity to pretend that the elections are going to kill a million people because of COVID, so they can continue to delay them.

That’s when the August blockades happened. I think Áñez’s desire to delay the elections as much as possible is easy to prove, there are many statements. She was already a candidate, but there was always a chance she wouldn’t win, so she tried to continue being president as much as possible. Obviously, there were ministers like (Interior Minister Arturo) Murillo who were stealing and wanted to continue doing so.

The August blockades are interesting because, given the context, it should have been a massacre of peasants. We have already had two massacres against pro-Evo demonstrations (in 2019). The Áñez government had no scruples, it controlled the army and did what it wanted with it. And then the social base of Añismo was hysterical.

And why did the press side with Áñez? It wasn’t about money, it was about ethnicity and race. Then the press started trying to go after the protesters.

The logic, and this is what I expected, was that Murillo would crush the protests with fire and sword. There is no evidence of this, but some say that Murillo told the army to end the blockades (which would necessarily have been by violence), and that they refused. Why? Because the blockades were very strong. The strength of the blockades was impressive, there were lots of stones from one village to another. Every village organized blockades. The blockade was really important, really impressive. (…) Thanks to this, the elections were brought forward.

Note: This interview was translated from Spanish to English by Nancy Piñeiro and has been edited for clarity and brevity.