Russia: A threat to NATO if the guns fall silent in Ukraine?

Russia’s ability and propensity to threaten NATO after the Ukraine war depends largely on the terms of a ceasefire or peace treaty. In order to assess Russia’s threat to NATO after the war, it must be taken into account that although the Ukrainian army has gained significant combat experience, Russia has also learned from the conflict. These findings extend beyond the battlefield, the West’s resolve has been tested, and upcoming elections or political crises in Western countries could impact their willingness to support Ukraine.

After the war, a Ukraine that could deter Moscow would be the strongest defense against further Russian expansion. However, the deployment of NATO troops or powerful long-range weapons in Ukraine, the most effective means of deterrence, was not positively received by NATO capitals. Throughout the war, NATO was determined to minimize the risk of armed conflict with Russia. The deployment of tripwire troops in Ukraine could lead directly to such a confrontation.

Kiev’s alternative plan is accelerated NATO membership. There is reportedly a growing consensus within NATO to consider this option. However, this raises a difficult question: are Ukraine and its key partners ready to recognize Russia’s annexation of parts of Ukrainian territory? Barring a significant setback on the battlefield, Moscow is likely to insist on such recognition as a prerequisite for an interim peace settlement.

Comparing the situation with West and East Germany is flawed because the security of the Federal Republic of Germany was guaranteed by the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union was prevented from changing the status quo or conquering additional territory. If Russia is willing and able to continue the war, a more apt comparison would be the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Russian Bolsheviks and Germany.

After the Bolsheviks initially refused to agree and attempted a “neither war nor peace” tactic during negotiations in early 1918, Germany resumed fighting and captured significant Russian territory. A separate peace treaty was signed just weeks later after the Bolsheviks recognized Germany’s new territorial conquests, some of which Russia only regained after Germany’s defeat by the Entente.

If Russia quickly gains ground in Ukraine, the risks of escalation could increase dramatically. Panic could spread across Europe, especially if Kiev shows a willingness to agree to unfavorable terms. Speaking to state-sponsored Russian pranksters posing as former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko earlier this year, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski admitted that Poland’s interest in supporting Ukraine would only increase if the Ukrainian front began to collapse.

Under such circumstances, Western governments would be torn between two major fears: the possibility of nuclear escalation by Russia and Russia’s westward push toward NATO borders. Essentially, they would choose between potentially catastrophic scenarios in the short or long term.

It is uncertain whether the European Union could show enough resolve if the United States suggests that the EU find ways to deter Russia. While this could mobilize Europe’s resources, it could also prove divisive and lead to mutual recriminations in the economically struggling bloc over who failed to recognize the Russian threat. A rising wave of nationalism in Europe, which could support Moscow, could further disrupt unity.

Even without a breakthrough by Russia, an escalation would be unavoidable if the willingness of Western partners to support Ukraine for political or economic reasons decreases significantly. While Ukraine is currently prevented by its partners from taking risky actions against Russia, Kiev could find itself forced to act independently in a critical situation. Recent discussions about Ukraine’s nuclear option suggest the possibility of such a scenario.

Although discussions about the need for negotiations are widespread, Russia reiterates that it is ready to continue the fight unless Ukraine meets all Russian demands, including, most importantly, the acceptance of neutral status, a non-starter for Kiev, which would give Moscow a free hand in post-war relations with NATO. The Kremlin cannot ignore the impact of peace on Russia’s internal stability. How long can Russia sustain its economy despite sanctions, rampant inflation and falling incomes without continually investing in its military-industrial complex?

The proverbial scenario has been led too far astray and is now in danger of being shattered, unleashing several malevolent forces. To achieve a lasting solution that can withstand Russia’s ongoing destructive revisionism, these forces must be contained again.

About the author

Mikhail Troitskiy is a visiting scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University and a visiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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