STORM — Small Table Oriented Redundancy-based SCA Mitigation for AES

Paper 2024/1187

STORM — Small Table Oriented Redundancy-based SCA Mitigation for AES

Yaacov BelenkyFortifyIQ, Inc.

Hennadii ChernyshchykFortifyIQ, Inc.

Oleg KaravaevFortifyIQ, Inc.

Oleh MaksymenkoFortifyIQ, Inc.

Valery TeperFortifyIQ, Inc.

Daria RyzhkovaFortifyIQ, Inc.

Itamar LeviBar-Ilan University

Osnat KerenBar-Ilan University

Yury KreimerFortifyIQ, Inc.

Abstract

Side-channel-analysis (SCA) resistance with cost optimization in AES hardware implementations remains a significant challenge. While traditional masking-based schemes offer provable security, they often include substantial resource overheads (latency, area, randomness, performance, power consumption). Alternatively, the RAMBAM scheme introduced a redundancy-based approach to control the signal-to-noise ratio, and achieves exponential leakage reduction as redundancy increases. This method results in only a slight increase in area and in power consumption, and a significant decrease in the amount of randomness needed, without any increase in latency. However, it lacks a formal security proof. In this study, we introduce a scheme, denoted STORM, that synergizes RAMBAM’s methodology with the utilization of look-up-tables (LUTs) in memory (ROM/RAM) in a redundant domain. STORM, like RAMBAM, is as fast as a typical unprotected implementation and has the same latency, but has a significantly higher maximal clock frequency than RAMBAM, and consumes less than half the power. RAMBAM and STORM are code-based schemes in the sense that their set of representations is a code in the vector space $GF(2)^{8+d}$. RAMBAM requires a richer structure of a ring on $GF(2)^{8+d}$ and a ring homomorphism whereas STORM utilizes a simple vector space. In code-based-masking (CBM), as in all masking schemes, non-interference based notions (tS/NI) are fundamental for establishing provable security. RAMBAM and STORM diverge from this approach. While CBM employs codes in vector spaces over $GF(2^8)$ for AES protection, RAMBAM and STORM use codes over $GF(2)$ without the need for tS/NI-gadgets, leaving them both smaller and more efficient. Independence in security proofs typically means that in each individual computation (in a clock-cycle), at least one share does not participate. This approach does not work for RAMBAM where several field multiplications are executed sequentially in a cycle. However, in STORM no multiplications are performed due to its memory based tables, leaving only (independent) bitwise-XORs. Therefore, the reasoning necessary for proving security is different and STORM, unlike RAMBAM, enjoys provable security. We consider two distinct scenarios, \emph{both with provable security}: (1) STORM1 — “leakage-free” memory reads, demonstrating (1,1,0)-robustness for LUTs with redundancy 2 in the 1 -probe model and for LUTs with redundancy 6 in the 2-probe model, and (2) STORM2 — leaky memory reads, where additional protection mechanisms and a notion of memory-read robustness are introduced. STORM can be implemented not only in HW, but in SW as well. However, this paper and the proofs in it relate to STORM’s HW implementations.